Analyzing Hezbollah

(I hope it makes sense it was written in a haste and with probably too much passion to allow clear thought.)
Thoughts about what the $@%* they’re thinking.

I always thought that Hezbollah, at least on some basic level, was working for what they perceived to be the best interests of their constituents. It appears that either I was wrong or something has changed. The Shiite community is the backbone of Hezbollah and has paid dearly in this summer’s conflict with Israel. What is best for the Shiites now is a period of calm, rebuilding and hopefully some type of economic rebound. This will allow the pledged grant money to roll in from the outside, pay for some rebuilding and possibly pave the way to a return to normal. Hezbollah is pushing the country in the opposite direction, dangerously close to a civil war, by making unreasonable demands of the government while at the same time leveling ludicrous and inflammatory accusations at it.

Currently Hezbollah is in trouble and in more ways than one. The summer war, while providing the Party of God with a temporary boon, has created many structural problems for the group. The war has left the group in a weaker state strategically and politically.

Strategically the war, while a big propaganda victory, turned out to be a disaster in the short and medium term (how it will be viewed in the long term depends on what happens now). They lost many of their best fighters, used much of their arsenal, spent a lot of money, had many of their bunkers and other infrastructure destroyed, revealed many surprise tactics and have nothing to show for it. Actually less than nothing – they now have ten thousand international UN troops and the Lebanese army deployed in the south (previously a Hezbollah only zone). Also, while the militia can still rearm via Syria it has become much more difficult to do so with all those eyes watching every move it makes. Additionally while they don’t control the government they cannot risk being discovered bringing large amount of weapons through the sea ports via Iran.

Hezbollah’s political situation, while appearing stronger than ever, is tenuous. While their supporters are proud of the military performance exhibited this summer they are also unhappy – with homes flattened, family members dead and an economy destroyed for a purely symbolic victory, who wouldn’t be? Winter is coming soon, and with some families living tents and with others without heat and electricity it is not going to be a happy season. There are two groups to blame for the heavy burden the Shiite populace has been asked to carry; the Israeli government and the Hezbollah politburo. Blaming Israel is easy, common and frankly, quite useless. After 50 years, it’s pretty clear that the Israeli government’s behavior towards and view of the general Arab population is not going to change. But Shiites blaming Hezbollah for its major miscalculation on the other hand would be groundbreaking and a very dangerous development for the party brass. Hezbollah has been doing all it can to deflect blame. Recently the party’s public pronouncements have taken a turn to the absurd – the leaders have been suggesting that the anti-Syrian government planned the war with the Israelis and was secretly encouraging the Israeli army throughout. (In reality Hezbollah started the war with rocket fire, the killing of Israeli soldiers and the capture of others. Additionally without the hard work of the anti-Syrian coalition and their contacts with the West the war would not have ended as quickly and unfinished as it did. And, most importantly Hezbollah was part of the government, holding several cabinet positions making some kind of pro-Israeli chicanery next to impossible.) This accusation is being made to attach blame to the government and to divide the population even more along sectarian lines in what is increasingly becoming a no-holds barred struggle for the control of Lebanon. The politics of fear and conspiracy is something Hezbollah practices with aplomb.

(The absurdities are endless. They call themselves the protectors of Lebanon and accuse others of subverting Lebanese sovereignty while accepting the murder of their enemies by foreign intelligence services and their Lebanese agents. They demand veto power over the cabinet while withholding the right to drag the country into war at whim.)

So Hezbollah is trying to regain the upper hand by exchanging the loss of homes, lives, and hard won autonomy in their areas into political gains. Hezbollah is demanding a veto over all cabinet decisions (even though last year’s election results clearly do not warrant such a prize) and the squashing of the international tribunal investigating the assassination of ex-PM Rafiq Harriri by Syrian agents (which they privately applauded, and possibly had a hand in). Other demands include early elections (in order to attempt to secure control of the parliament before it votes for a new president next year) and possibly a constitutional revisal allowing a Shiite president (currently he must be a Maronite Christian).
The logic of these positions hinges on new polls (conducted by Hezbollah) showing that Hezbollah would win elections if they are held today and the fact that the Shiites are a plurality of the populations but do control the cabinet, parliament, presidency or prime-minister’s office. This all sounds reasonable unless you think about it (thinking has never been a problem for Nasrallah and the boys). Elections are held at regular intervals or when the government fails to win a vote of confidence not whenever a minority party believes it can win or the polls change (I won’t bother to point out the rest of the errors in the logical gymnastics routine that is that Hezbollah argument). In free and fair parliamentary elections held in the summer of 2005 Hezbollah and its allied parties did not win enough seats to control the government but after negotiation the ruling coalition gave them cabinet appointments anyway (but not enough to veto cabinet decisions). The parliament votes in the PM and the cabinet explaining the legitimate control of those instruments by groups other than Hezbollah. As for Hezbollah's leaders often heard complaint that the Shiite plurality is under-represented; that they, as the largest group, should rule the country - it too is fundamentally flawed. While Shiites are about 35% to 40% of the populations as long as Hezbollah cannot convince some part of the rest of the country to agree with them it is pretty unrealistic to demand control of the executive - at least without making any kind of concessions.
And meanwhile back in the real world one big problem in Lebanon is that Hezbollah and its allies (foreign and domestic) control the presidency now and are using it to paralyze the government. Maronite President Emile Lahoud is a Syrian lapdog, a holdover from the previous parliament (and from what I hear as closeted as a pair of flared slacks) and could not be more pro-Hezbollah is he spoke farsi. The real danger for Hezbollah comes next year when Lahoud’s term is up and a new president will be elected. If that election is held by the current parliament the new president won’t be as friendly to Damascus, Tehran or Hezbollah as Lahoud. This would leave Hezbollah in a weaker position but one that it could definitely recover from as a political party but it is a situation that will probably erode some of its military power.

But Iran and Syria are not interested in Hezbollah as a political party in the long term – they’re interest lies in Hezbollah the military force (a useful tool for poking the Americans and Israelis without much risk to them). They believe that the time of America’s hegemony over the Middle East is over and they want to push it out the door. A well-armed and dominant Hezbollah is key to that strategy even if it means breaking Lebanon (Shiites included) to get it. Hezbollah’s brass is emboldened by their foreign support and more than willing to play along. As long as Iran keep the oil money flowing into party coffers Hezbollah feels that it can punch above its weight in Lebanon, making unreasonable demands and spewing venomous insults. Nasrallah and company don’t care if these actions hurt their people, after all they are adept at using their supporters’ fears and prejudices to deflect attention away from unsavory party business. Strangling the last bits of progressiveness out of Lebanon and rearming to take on the their blood enemy Israel seems to be the only goal now. Hezbollah seems to be saying we're taking over and if you don't like it fight us, shut up or leave.

So that’s were we are today: a wounded and belligerent Hezbollah being encouraged by outside actors to take a reckless course to achieve unwarranted dominance over Lebanon. And so the assassinations begin anew. Today Pierre Gemayel. Tomorrow, who knows? Probably Walid Jumblatt.

And a new worrying development:

This new assassination seems different in character from the others (see 2005 below). While the others were about elimination and intimidation this seems to have the added goal of provocation. The last time a Gemayel was assassinated it caused a bloodbath (Sabra and Shatilla massacres included) that did not end for eight years (see 1982 below). It is unclear if Hezbollah is inviting reprisal in order to justify violence or just sending out a clear message that the civil war option is not one they are afraid of but either way these are bad times for Lebanon.

That’s it for now – but more soon.

FROM THE NYT (more than a few overgeneralizations but whatever):
APRIL 1975 -- Clashes that are later seen as the start of Lebanon's 15-year civil war erupt in Beirut.
JUNE 1976 -- Syrian troops enter Lebanon to restore peace.
OCTOBER 1976 -- Arab conferences establish a predominantly Syrian peacekeeping force.
JUNE 1982 -- After repeated Palestinian incursions from southern Lebanon, Israel begins a full-scale invasion. The Syrian Army is ousted from Beirut.
SEPTEMBER 1982 -- President-elect Bashir Gemayel was killed when a bomb shattered the headquarters of his Lebanese Christian Phalangist Party in east Beirut.
MAY 1983 -- Israel and Lebanon sign a peace accord detailing the withdrawal of Israeli troops.
MARCH 1984 -- Under intense pressure from Syria, the Lebanese government cancels its peace agreement with Israel.
MARCH 1989 -- The Maronite Christian leader in Lebanon, Gen. Michel Aoun, declares a ''war of liberation'' against the Syrian presence.
OCTOBER 1989 -- The Lebanese National Assembly takes a step toward ending the civil war by endorsing the so-called Taif Accord, which calls for Syria to pull its troops back to the eastern Bekaa region but does not set a date for a full pullout.
OCTOBER 1990 -- In one of the last moves of the civil war, Syria's Air Force attacks the Lebanese presidential palace, and General Aoun takes refuge in the French Embassy. Through the early 90's, Syrian dominance in the country becomes less overt.
OCTOBER 1998 -- Emile Lahoud, a general who is backed by Syria, is elected president by Parliament.
MAY 2000 -- Israel ends its occupation of southern Lebanon.
DECEMBER 2000 -- In a surprise move, hundreds of Syrian soldiers leave Beirut and settle in the Bekaa region near the border, though thousands still remain in the country.
2003 -- Syria carries out two partial troop withdrawals, in February and July, bringing its force in Lebanon to about 16,000 soldiers, down from about 30,000 troops in mid-2000.
SEPTEMBER 2004 -- Despite criticism from the U.N. Security Council, Parliament bows to Syrian pressure and extends Mr. Lahoud's presidential term by three years.
OCTOBER 2004 -- Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and his cabinet resign in protest over Syria's dominant role in Lebanese government.
DECEMBER 2004 -- A united Lebanese opposition denounces the Syrian presence and calls for a new government. Later, Syria for the first time admits the presence of its secret service in Lebanon and says it will dismantle the operation.
FEBRUARY 2005 -- Mr. Hariri and 14 others are killed in a car bombing in Beirut.
JUNE 2 -- Samir Kassir, journalist opposed to Syria's role in Lebanon, is killed in Beirut by bomb in his car.
JUNE 21 -- George Hawi, a former Communist Party leader and critic of Syria, is killed in Beirut by bomb in his car.
DECEMBER 12 -- Gebran Tueni, a staunchly anti-Syrian member of parliament and Lebanese newspaper magnate, is killed by a car bomb in Beirut.
NOVEMBER 21 -- Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel is killed by gunmen as his convoy drives through the Christian Sin el-Fil neighbourhood of Beirut.